Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and Hungary by Aalto, Pami et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rege20
Eurasian Geography and Economics
ISSN: 1538-7216 (Print) 1938-2863 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and
Hungary
Pami Aalto, Heino Nyyssönen, Matti Kojo & Pallavi Pal
To cite this article: Pami Aalto, Heino Nyyssönen, Matti Kojo & Pallavi Pal (2017) Russian nuclear
energy diplomacy in Finland and Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 58:4, 386-417,
DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2017.1396905
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2017.1396905
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 05 Nov 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 557
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Eurasian GEoGraphy and Economics, 2017
VoL. 58, no. 4, 386–417
https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2017.1396905
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and 
Hungary
Pami Aaltoa  , Heino Nyyssönenb, Matti Kojoa and Pallavi Pala
aFaculty of management/politics, university of Tampere, Tampere, Finland; bFaculty of social sciences/
political science, university of Turku, Finland
ABSTRACT
We compare Russian nuclear energy diplomacy towards 
Finland and Hungary, where the Russian state corporation 
Rosatom intends to build nuclear power plants by the 2020s. 
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy features Rosatom working 
with other state institutions, its own subsidiaries and an 
extensive network of companies and R&D actors to support 
Russian nuclear power projects abroad. Using the structuration 
approach, we find three interests driving such diplomacy: 
energy business and associated profits; modernization of the 
Russian economy, including the diversification of its export 
structure; while foreign policy interests are also involved, 
considering the constraints emerging in EU-Russia energy 
diplomacy in the oil and gas sectors, including the sanctions 
since 2014. Some domestic actors in Finland and Hungary 
make the linkage between nuclear energy and foreign policy 
as explicit as do some western commentators. Seeking to 
pursue these interests, Russian actors must accommodate 
their considerable assets to the structural constraints they 
encounter in the target countries. We identify four structural 
dimensions The Russian actors are well endowed as regards 
the resources, technology, and infrastructure dimension; 
and the dimension of finance, business models, and 
markets. However, on the institutional dimension they face 
a less controllable environment. Regarding the ecological 
dimension, they must conform to local safety requirements. 
In both cases, Russian actors were able to strengthen 
perceptions of joint interests with actors in the target country 
facilitating the nuclear power plant projects, thereby paving 
the way for the use of soft power.
Introduction
The energy diplomacy pursued by Russian political and business actors throughout 
Eurasia and beyond is a frequently examined subject. Existing research focuses on 
negotiations on the development of new fields, pipelines and terminals, supply 
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contracts, and delivery prices of Russian oil and natural gas (e.g. Shadrina 2014) 
and on institutions, agreements, and disputes between Russia and its customer 
countries (Belyi 2015; Romanova 2016). Further studies analyze how the market 
entry of shale oil and gas from United States fields has intensified the competition 
for Russian exporters (Kropatcheva 2014). However, the political and economic 
sanctions imposed by the EU and several other states in Europe, America, and Asia 
since Russia’s annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 hamper the energy 
diplomacy of Russian actors (Aalto and Forsberg 2016). This “hard power” facet of 
Russian foreign policy fuels distrust, reinforcing the realist-geopolitical reading of 
energy issues being inseparable from Russian foreign policy (Dannreuther 2016; 
Hadfield 2016). It is here that nuclear energy diplomacy emerges as a more “soft 
power” facet of Russian actions, resulting in commercially attractive agreements 
on the delivery of nuclear power plants (NPPs).
Russian energy diplomacy in the nuclear power sector has been little examined, 
although nineteen countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa have recently signed agree-
ments with Russian parties on the construction of NPPs or supply of nuclear fuel, 
or have such cooperation ongoing. Currently over one-quarter of globally ongoing 
civilian nuclear power projects makes Russia and its state corporation Rosatom – 
with over 350 subsidiary companies – the largest provider in this strategic market. 
In 2013 Rosatom had contracts worth US$66.5 billion in this roughly US$500 billion 
market and intended to triple its sales by 2030 (David 2014). In 2016 its contract 
portfolio reached US$100 billion (De Clercq, Burmistrova, and Stubbs 2016). Such 
volumes of trade require proactive diplomacy mobilizing the state and a network 
of actors to support the operations of Rosatom abroad. Some western observers 
note that this may increase Russian influence and alter the international balance 
of power (David 2014; Armstrong 2015; De Clercq, Burmistrova, and Stubbs 2016). 
Since the late 2000s Russian foreign policy and energy diplomacy have indeed 
become more assertive, notably toward the former Soviet Union area (Casier 2016). 
However, in the key EU markets, Russia combines “geopolitical” approaches to the 
conduct of diplomacy with legalistic and technocratic ones (Romanova 2016). 
These nuances are sometimes lost in the EU energy debate, where perceptions 
of dependence on Russian energy supplies have become more alarmist owing to 
price peaks and discussion being shaped by some Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) Member States with troubled historical legacies vis-à-vis Russia (Casier 2016). 
For example, several CEE states, in particular the Baltic states and Poland, have 
criticized the planned Nord Stream-2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany 
through the Baltic Sea, drawing support from Denmark. The European Commission, 
also critical of the project, in June 2017 requested a mandate to negotiate on the 
matter on behalf of the Member States.
In this article we pursue a balanced analysis free from any alarmism. To parse 
out the various aspects that can be related to Russia’s NPP exports, we first sys-
tematically examine the interests driving Russian nuclear energy diplomacy and 
then the structures within which Russian actors seek to promote those interests 
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in the target countries. Our scope is limited to civil nuclear energy. Although most 
of Rosatom’s international projects are in Asia, we focus on two cases in the EU; 
namely, Finland and Hungary. This focus is relevant for several reasons. First, we 
cover Rosatom’s two major NPP supply agreements in the EU – one in an “old” EU 
Member State (Finland) and the other more recently acceded (Hungary).1 Finland 
and Hungary contracted new NPPs from Rosatom in 2013 and 2014 respectively, 
both scheduled to start operation in the 2020s. Second, the two countries have 
extensive energy trade with Russia and Soviet-supplied NPPs. Third, nuclear power 
is crucial for both, accounting in 2014 for 35% of domestically produced electricity 
in Finland and for 53% in Hungary (World Nuclear Association [WNA] 2016). Fourth, 
the contracts not only provide a key EU-area reference for Rosatom’s international 
activities but also represent a diplomatic triumph for Russia. The diplomatic gains 
are significant in view of the EU’s sanctions against selected Russian actors in which 
Finland and Hungary also participate.2 In the case of Finland, the contract also goes 
against the tide in the wider geostrategic context, where the country is intensifying 
its cooperation with the NATO military alliance and where the Russian parties react 
negatively to the re-activated debate on possible future NATO membership, in 
view of the two countries sharing a border.3 Fifth, Finland and Hungary are inter-
esting inasmuch as they are legally bound by the EU competition rules governing 
energy projects and politically committed to the target of the Energy Union of 
reducing dependencies on large external suppliers (European Commission 2015a). 
As such, they are part of an integrating energy market promoting liberalization 
to enhance competition, whereas Russia retains control over most of the energy 
sector (Dannreuther 2016), with some competition in the electricity market (Aalto 
et al. 2012).
In short, the Finnish and Hungarian cases typify the mixture of historically devel-
oped bilateral energy cooperation and contemporary multilateral structures of 
EU-Russia energy relations with mounting tensions and the two parties on dif-
ferent market development trajectories. We hereby ask (1) which interests drive 
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in the cases of Finland and Hungary, and (2) 
to what extent can Russian actors realize their interests in these two cases. Our 
comparison seeks to assess the balance between the assets Russian actors possess 
and the structural constraints they encounter in the pursuit of their interests. We 
aim thereby to provide a firmer basis for further research and debate on Russian 
nuclear energy diplomacy. Alongside case-specific features, we will also address 
EU-level legal obligations and commitments. Our main focus will be on the con-
duct and room to maneuver of Russian actors rather than on the policies of the 
EU, Finland, or Hungary per se.
In the second section of this article we survey the existing research. In the third 
section, we discuss our methodological solutions, including our conceptualization 
of Russian actors, their interests, and the structures encountered in operations 
abroad. In the fourth and fifth sections we examine the conduct of Russian actors 
before presenting our conclusions.
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Russian nuclear energy diplomacy: What do we know?
Existing research is scarce and does not address what nuclear energy diplomacy 
might mean on the conceptual plane or specifically in the Russian context. In a 
rare systematic study, Stulberg (2007) found that the predecessor of Rosatom, the 
Federal Agency on Atomic Energy, succeeded in promoting nuclear energy agree-
ments with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan by widening the range of choices of the 
target countries. To this end, it offered joint ventures, asset swaps, and extension 
of trade relations to other segments and products. Even though foreign policy 
interests were involved, Russian actors made strategic compromises when required 
to pursue business interests.
Kurtov (2010) situates Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in the context of global 
competition for oil and gas due to the high prices of the mid-2000s that amplified 
the potential of nuclear energy. He also mentions how the Russian activities in 
constructing the Bushehr NPP in Iran led to controversies with the US and NATO 
(Kurtov 2010). In this context, Rosatom’s contract for an NPP in Akkuyu, Turkey, in 
May 2010 was significant given that Turkey is a NATO member with special ties to 
the United States and supported the bid by Russia to become a “global leader in 
nuclear power plant construction” (Sotnikov 2010).
Lowry (2016) notes how civil nuclear power technology is indeed one of the 
strategic high technology industries supported by the Russian state as part of a 
developmental agenda. At the same time, Oxenstierna (2014) implies that the 
Russian business and developmental interests presuppose assuming a strong role 
in international cooperation on nuclear safety and security issues, especially in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011.
There are no systematic studies on Russian nuclear energy diplomacy towards 
the EU, Finland, or Hungary. Yet we know that in the Finnish domestic debate, the 
pro-nuclear lobby framed the 2013 contract with Rosatom in terms of the decar-
bonization prospects of nuclear power. The Finnish actors moreover expressed 
an interest in security of supply by stressing how building a modern plant would 
reduce the need to buy electricity from Russia (Syrjämäki, Kojo, and Litmanen 
2015; Ylönen et al. 2015).
Methodological solutions: How to approach Russian nuclear energy 
diplomacy
Our main methodological solution is to apply the structuration approach, caus-
ing us on the one hand to study the interaction among Russian actors and their 
interests, and on the other, the structures shaping their operations abroad. The 
constraining and enabling qualities of these structures are modeled in terms of 
policy environments with four analytically distinguishable dimensions (Aalto et 
al. 2012).
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Actors
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy is a coordination exercise involving several 
actors. The state is the formal leader: the President, his administration, and the 
relevant ministries, and agencies. In practice, Rosatom is the most engaged Russian 
actor. It is a strategic, vertically integrated, and fully state-owned enterprise with 
wide-ranging responsibilities and several subsidiaries.
Rosatom explores uranium deposits, produces nuclear fuel commodities by 
means of conversion and enrichment, designs reactors and power plants, and 
offers other technological solutions, also operating the plants. In 2015 Rosatom 
provided for 18.6% of Russia’s electricity supply, aiming at 25–30% by 2030 and 
45–50% by 2050 (WNA 2015). Nuclear safety, storage, and the management of 
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste are also among Rosatom’s functions. 
Rosatom not only seeks global technological leadership (Rosatom 2015a) but also 
participates in international cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Rosatom coordinates a large network of engineering, infrastructure, and con-
struction companies, as well as scientific and R&D actors, many of which receive 
state funding. In these networks, individuals can circulate from one company to 
another or between companies and state institutions (Tikkala 2016). Rosatom 
moreover operates technology parks and finances innovations. Its eligibility to 
receive financing from the state is a crucial asset in this capital-intensive high 
technology business (Lowry 2016).
Interests
A balanced assessment of these actors’ combined actions requires us to examine 
what they are after. We identify three main interests for the state, Rosatom, and its 
networks driving their interaction with Finnish and Hungarian actors.
First, the Russian actors share an interest in energy business and profits. 
This interest pertains to the international nuclear energy market that the US 
Department of Commerce expects to grow from US$500 billion to US$740 billion 
over the next decade. The profits not only drive the management of the compa-
nies involved, but also support the fiscal interests of both the Russian Federation 
and the regions through the numerous Rosatom subsidiaries (see Table 1). The 
Russian government’s 2008 Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development 
until 2020 names high technology industries as a major driver of future economic 
growth. However, high technology so far accounts for only 3% of GDP, including 
the nuclear energy sector. Yet the potential is considerable since Russia has econ-
omies of scale in this area and the lowest costs in the world for uranium enrich-
ment (Lowry 2016). The national program “Development of the Nuclear Power 
and Industry Complex” targets a 53% growth in overseas revenues by 2020 and a 
14.9% growth in the industry’s contribution to the volume of GDP (Government of 
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the Russian Federation 2014). The energy business is also a significant employer. If 
we assume that each US$1 billion in exports leads to some 5000 domestic manu-
facturing jobs (David 2014) and that Rosatom’s exports will triple from 2013 as the 
Table 1. main subsidiaries of rosatom in the Finnish and hungarian cases.
aThe st. petersburg division of atomenergoproekt together with VnipiET Lead institute became parts of atompro-
ekt. This subsidiary handles both the hanhikivi-1 and paks-2 reactor construction contracts (atomproekt 2014).
bThe nizhny novgorod design institute merged in 2012 with atomstroyexport (asE) in order to bolster asE’s engi-
neering capability and enhance the competitive capacities of both companies. From 2014 it became the par-
ent company of atomenergoproekt (aEp). The reasoning behind this merger was to consolidate russia’s nuclear 
power engineering expertise into a single division. aEp has three divisions: in moscow, in saint petersburg, and in 
nizhny novgorod. The nizhny novgorod division and the moscow division of aEp are under the executive control 
of the niaEp-asE (Wnn 2014).
Subsidiaries Role
Jsc atomenergoprom (Jsc aEp) The rosatom subsidiary holding company for civil 
nuclear energy that includes power plant operator 
rosenergoatom; nuclear fuel producer and supplier 
TVEL; uranium trader Tenex; equipment supplier 
atomenergomash; and overseas nuclear builder 
atomstroyexport
rosenergoatom concern oJsc a rosatom and atomenergoprom subsidiary respon-
sible for operating the npps and selling the power 
generated
TVEL Fuel company a rosatom and atomenergoprom subsidiary 
responsible for nuclear fuel assemblies, production, 
and supply of nuclear fuel to russian npps and 
abroad. in 2013 TVEL along with rosatom drafted 
the nuclear supply agreements with Finnish and 
hungarian actors
TEnEX (Techsnabexport) a rosatom and atomenergoprom subsidiary respon-
sible for uranium conversion or enrichment services 
and for exporting nuclear fuel
Jsc concern Titan-2 an engineering company responsible for site prepa-
ration, construction, and installation work, as well 
as development of design and supply of all the 
required material and equipment
atomenergomash Group (aEm Group) a rosatom, atomenergoprom, and TVEL subsidiary 
responsible for equipment design, production, 
delivery, installation, and maintenance for nuclear 
as well as conventional power plants
Jsc atomproekta an engineering company designing npps and provid-
ing them with modern computer-based instrumen-
tation and control systems
Jsc nizhny novgorod Engineering company (Jsc 
niaEp) <<atomenergoproekt>>b
an engineering company that designs, constructs, 
and puts into operation power facilities in russia 
and implements projects abroad. also provides 
them with modern computer-based instrumenta-
tion and control systems
Jsc atomstroyexport (Jsc asE) a key foreign trade engineering company responsi-
ble for the construction of nuclear power facilities 
abroad; since 2012, working with Jsc niaEp for 
the implementation of its projects as a part of the 
integrated company Jsc niaEp-Jsc asE
oKB Gidropress a subsidiary of rosatom responsible for designing the 
equipment and systems intended for power and 
nuclear industry
raos project oy a Finnish subsidiary in charge of the nuclear reactor 
supply to the hanhikivi-1 npp
raos Voima oy a Finnish subsidiary representing rosatom with 34% 
in the Finnish Fennovoima, a private company 
building the sixth npp unit in Finland
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company expects, the number of skilled employees in this sector would grow from 
some 300,000 to almost a million (Government of the Russian Federation 2014).4
Second, the nuclear energy business helps to promote Russia’s wider socio-eco-
nomic interests in the form of the modernization of the economy and diversifica-
tion of its export structure. The Russian economy is locked into resource revenues 
from oil and natural gas (Gaddy and Ickes 2013). Russian energy policy planning 
seeks to reduce this dependence. Instead of taking fossil fuel resources as the main 
vehicle of development, it identifies the energy sector overall as an infrastructure 
to be developed (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2014). This implies 
that Russian economic policy is taking a more developmentalist direction. The 
state actively supports high technology industries and R&D in areas in which Russia 
continues to enjoy competitive advantage as a legacy of the Soviet era. Rosatom 
is one of these national champion companies. Since its reform in 2007, Rosatom 
has increased its investments in R&D sevenfold, the annual rate being relatively 
high at 4.5% (Lowry 2016). The nuclear industry can help to further diversify the 
economy and exports by generating demand for products and services in engi-
neering, the steel industry, geology, and construction. The NPP projects abroad 
have such wide-ranging modernization potential by virtue of Rosatom using sev-
eral Russian contractors.
Third, the interest of the state in foreign policy influence also shapes the 
activities of Rosatom abroad. Some western commentators think Russian-built 
NPPs function like embassies (Armstrong 2015). Owing to the respective long-
term contracts, they increase political cooperation with the host countries (see 
Sputnik News 2015). For some, these projects are “firmly on the Russian President’s 
agenda”; therefore, “while nuclear power exports have both commercial aspects 
and modernizing arguments supporting them, their strategic and political value 
is also undeniable” (Martikainen and Vihma 2016). The Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2013 states more neutrally that one of the basic goals of foreign pol-
icy is “strengthening Russia’s positions in the global trade and economic system, 
providing diplomatic support to national economic operators abroad” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2013). To this end, Russia “works to create favorable political envi-
ronment to diversify Russia’s presence in global markets through the broadening of 
its exports nomenclature and of the geography of its foreign economic and invest-
ment relations” (2013). At the same time, Russia’s National Security Strategy of 2016 
mentions somewhat bleak economic prospects and identifies the sanctions as an 
impediment to diplomatic efforts to remedy the situation (Kureev 2016). Although 
official strategies remain ambiguous on the connections between foreign policy 
and energy (or even more so for nuclear energy), scholarly analyses frequently link 
the two. However, as discussed below, we should not equate them in a traditional 
geopolitical fashion but need more nuanced analysis in the EU-Russian context in 
particular (see Dannreuther 2016).
Such detailed analysis must acknowledge how Russian actors pursue their inter-
ests in an interactive context where their counterparts’ “readings” or interpretations 
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of these Russian interests are decisive. Borrowing from Feklyunina (2016), the 
energy business and profit interests, for example, may be pertinent not only for 
Russian actors, but also for actors in the target country. If so, a degree of collective 
identity prevails between the two parties. Such a compatible understanding of 
“our” joint interests opens a window of opportunity for Russian actors to exercise 
“soft power” making certain outcomes more likely than others; for example, facil-
itating agreements on NPP projects. How we see the pursuit of Russian interests 
is always a subjective and context-dependent exercise. Russian actions can be 
associated with hard power qualities if perceived to have been imposed or with 
soft power qualities if perceived as a shared property of the parties.
The three interests we discern are also interrelated and as such may be mutually 
supportive or incompatible. The weight of each interest varies. Actors may pursue 
them explicitly or implicitly. We can now hypothesize that the extent to which the 
Russian actors can further their interests in nuclear energy diplomacy is a case- and 
context-specific question. The realization of the interests depends on the balance 
between the assets Russian actors possess and the constraints of the structure in 
which they conduct their operations. We will model the structure in Finland and 
Hungary within the concept of the policy environment. It includes four dimensions 
shaping the way in which Russian actors can further their interests.
Policy environments
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy encounters various policy environments in indi-
vidual EU Member States. The main principles of the Energy Union – energy secu-
rity, competitive market, energy efficiency, de-carbonization, and R&D (European 
European Commission 2015a) – set the overall policy framework for nuclear energy. 
The Euratom Treaty of 1957 sets a 20% limit on the supply of uranium to nuclear 
power plants from a single external source and stipulates cooperation on nuclear 
research, safety, and security (Maltby 2013). The markets principle of EU energy pol-
icy requires the use of a competitive process for the contracting of nuclear power 
plants. Apart from these provisions, the EU lacks an explicit nuclear energy policy. 
The Fukushima disaster further reduced the demand for such a policy (Talus 2013). 
While Germany is phasing out its NPPs and Sweden refrains from building any 
more, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and the United Kingdom continue with their nuclear power projects 
(European Commission 2017a).
Alongside this generic EU policy framework, Russian actors must meticulously 
analyze the national policy environment in which they wish to operate. We suggest 
starting this analysis from the resources, technology, and infrastructure dimen-
sion. Russian actors can shape this dimension decisively. In 2014, 18% of uranium 
supplied to the EU came from Russia (WNA 2015). The Russian firm JSC TVEL has a 
near- monopoly over fuel supply for the VVER-440 reactors in the EU (Vlček 2016). 
The VVER-440 units are the first type of the VVER family and number altogether 
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14 units in the EU, including the existing reactors in Hungary and two out of four 
operative reactors in Finland. Today they utilize exclusively Russian fuel. However, 
during the period 2001–2007, the US-based firm Westinghouse supplied the two 
reactors in Finland (WNA 2016). Rosatom has advanced nuclear reactor technology, 
and, as a fully integrated company, can together with its network supply the full 
infrastructure of its NPPs.
The second dimension concerns finance, business models, and markets. Here 
Russia’s competitive advantage includes low production costs of uranium and 
nuclear fuel, as well as state finance for NPP projects that its direct competitors – 
the French Areva, Japanese Mitsubishi, and Westinghouse (the majority of which 
is owned by the Japanese Toshiba) – cannot offer. Areva and Westinghouse experi-
enced serious financial difficulties in the 2010s, and in March 2017, Westinghouse 
filed for bankruptcy. The German firm Siemens announced in 2011 its intention 
to leave the NPP supplier industry. The other German companies E.On, EnBW, 
and RWE, together with Vattenfall’s nuclear energy subsidiary, are also gradually 
downsizing their operations. Rosatom has several business models ranging from 
a turnkey model to a build, own, and operate model. It expects customers to value 
the constant “base-load” power supplied by the final plant, offsetting the potential 
market pitfalls of weather-dependent generation of solar and wind power that 
is rapidly entering the markets with its near-zero production costs and, in many 
cases, subsidies.
The institutional dimension is where Rosatom faces more constraints. It had 
to give assurances that its Akkuyu NPP project in Turkey would continue when 
threatened by Russian and Turkish foreign policy interests following the down-
ing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey in December 2015. In Finland and Hungary, 
Russian actors must convince formal institutions such as governments, relevant 
agencies, and parliaments. They must undergo the national licensing process and 
conform to the interpretations of the EU regarding permitting and competitive 
procurement. Russian actors need to factor in the informal institutions in the target 
country shaping expectations and acceptability. At the same time, they have to 
optimize support from the political institutions of Russia without over-politicizing 
the projects. This is challenging: Russia’s use of hard power in Georgia in 2008, 
then in the Crimea, and its involvement in eastern Ukraine all caused concern. 
Likewise, the use of soft power through governmental and quasi-governmental 
institutions such as the Russia Today news agency, as well as other technological 
and civil society tools as outlined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, 
also caused concern (Mäkinen 2016). The constraint Russia encounters here is 
how its soft power actions may be interpreted as a challenge to established order, 
triggering perceptions of a “revisionist” Russia (Rutland and Kazantsev 2016).
Finally, with an eye to the ecological dimension, Rosatom offers solutions 
responding to the self-imposed de-carbonization policies the EU Member States 
agreed upon in 2014 of a 40% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 from the 
1990 level. At the same time, the projects must undergo environmental impact 
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assessments to satisfy national and local ecological requirements. In safety issues, 
Rosatom still suffers in the EU markets from the specter of the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear accident. Regarding nuclear waste management, Finland and Hungary 
expect their national commissioning companies to arrange the storage and final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, although Rosatom could also offer such services, 
including reprocessing.
Having conceptualized the actors, their interests, and the four dimensions of 
the policy environment within which they conduct the NPP projects, we can now 
define Russian nuclear energy diplomacy. It concerns international interaction by a 
network of Russian actors to accommodate various interests ranging from energy 
business to modernization and foreign policy influence in the sphere of exports 
of nuclear power plants and related solutions (Figure 1).
Data sources
We will use documents published by state and company actors in Russia, Finland, 
Hungary, and also by the EU; reports of intergovernmental organizations and 
NGOs; and likewise, statistics, news items, and opinions. Our analysis also draws 
upon seven interviews conducted in late 2014 with Russian experts in international 
relations and energy policy. For both Finland and Hungary, we will first outline the 
historical background of nuclear energy relations with Russia and then analyze 
Figure 1. actors, interests, and structures in russian nuclear energy diplomacy.
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the conduct of Russian actors with regard to each of the four dimensions and the 
respective interpretations by the Finnish and Hungarian parties.
The realization of Russian interests in the case of Finland
In 2015, 34% of the electricity produced in Finland was from nuclear power, 45% 
from renewables (mostly hydropower and biomass), 12% from coal, and 8% from 
natural gas and other non-renewable sources; altogether 21% of the electricity 
consumed was imported (European Commission 2017b). The share of Russian 
electricity imports varies depending on the market situation. In 2015 the share 
of Russian imports, including fuels, in the final consumption of energy was 45% 
(Tilastokeskus 2016).
Finland’s first NPP in Loviisa has two Soviet-type nuclear reactors. Furthermore, 
all spent nuclear fuel produced in this NPP was transported to the Soviet Union/
Russia during the period 1981–1996. The acquisition of the first units was highly 
politicized in the 1960s and 1970s. Although initially the West German reactor type 
was preferred, due to political pressure from Russia the final contract was signed 
with the Soviet V/O Technopromexport (Sunell 2004; Michelsen and Särkikoski 
2005). Ever since, Russian suppliers have offered reactors in response to Finnish 
tenders, but have lost. Rosatom also lost in the bidding process in 2009 for Finland’s 
sixth nuclear reactor to the German E.ON. When E.ON withdrew in October 2012 
in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the Finnish commissioning company 
Fennovoima downsized the plan and chose Rosatom’s AES-2006 1200 MW reactor.
The resources, technology, and infrastructure dimension
In addition to the contract for a reactor, in 2013 Rosatom’s subsidiary, JSC TVEL, won 
a contract to supply nuclear fuel for a plant called Hanhikivi-1. Due to a 10-year 
fuel contract, Fennovoima had to address concerns expressed in the Finnish 
Parliament about excessive dependence on Russian resources (e.g. Pohjanpalo 
2014). Fennovoima (n.d.) responded that the contract conformed to the EU’s 
energy security provisions.
Rosatom also expanded its business interests toward electricity sales by becom-
ing a 34% owner of Fennovoima through its subsidiary RAOS Voima Oy (see Table 
1). For Rosatom (2013), these contracts signified “the year of many Russian victories 
in important nuclear power plant construction tenders abroad.”
The Hanhikivi-1 project also promotes interest in the modernization of the 
Russian economy and the diversification of its export structure by showcasing 
Russian nuclear technology. This was important in view of the Fukushima accident. 
Fennovoima stated that the plant “corresponds with IAEA and European Utility 
Requirements (EUR), and for licensing purposes it will be adapted to be in accord-
ance with Finnish national safety standards” (Fennovoima 2013a). However, in 
October 2016 Fennovoima had to concede that Rosatom had experienced serious 
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delays in producing the documentation for a construction license (Myllykoski 
2016). Rosatom therefore considered switching the reactor supplier from RAOS 
Project to Atomstroyexport (Iltalehti 2016).
The selection of Russian companies JSC Concern Titan-2, Atomenergomash, 
OKB Gidropress, and Atomproekt as the main subcontractors for infrastructure 
further served Russian business and modernization interests. To consolidate the 
joint business interest with Finnish actors, Titan-2 chose 10 Finnish subcontractors 
(Rosatom 2015a; Titan-2 2016.)
The financial, business models, and markets dimension
The cost estimate of the project is €6.5 to 7 billion, €1.7 billion of which is to be 
covered by the Finnish and Russian owners’ capital. To cover the rest, JSC Rosatom 
Overseas will arrange debt financing of €4.8 to 5.3 billion for Fennovoima. Part of the 
loan (€2.4 billion) is to come from the Russian National Wealth Fund (Fennovoima 
2015a). On the one hand, the Russian state investment supported the business 
interests of Rosatom by affording it a competitive advantage, and on the other, it 
served as a constraint owing to the consequent suspicions of the foreign policy 
implications of such an amount of Russian capital in Finland. The government of 
Finland therefore imposed a minimum 60% Finnish or EU-area ownership require-
ment for further licensing for construction (The Council of State 2014; Syrjämäki, 
Kojo, and Litmanen 2015), thus thwarting Rosatom’s wish to increase its share of 
Fennovoima up to 49% (Kokkonen 2014). Voimaosakeyhtiö SF, with a 66% hold-
ing represents the Finnish actors and, according to the shareholders’ agreement, 
should continue to be the majority owner of Fennovoima.
Fennovoima fulfilled the government’s 60% requirement when the majority 
state-owned electricity company Fortum announced immediately before the 
parliamentary vote on Fennovoima’s application its interest in investing a max-
imum of 15% in Fennovoima, raising speculation about political pressure. The 
business interest of Fortum was to facilitate the acquisition of hydropower assets 
from Gazprom in Russia in collaboration with Rosatom and to support its exist-
ing investments in Russia. As the rearrangements regarding Russian hydropower 
assets were incomplete, Fortum postponed its investment decision on Fennovoima 
(Fortum 2014, 2015a; Syrjämäki, Kojo, and Litmanen 2015).
In this connection a small Croatian company, Migrit Solarna Energija, emerged 
as an investor (Fennovoima 2015b), only for the Finnish Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE)5 to find the company to be a front organization 
connected with Russian actors. The credit arrangements of the Russian state-
owned Sberbank on Migrit conflicted with the precondition for 60% EU-area 
ownership (MEAE 2015). Fortum eventually acquired a 6.6% share in Fennovoima 
(Fortum 2015b). The partly state-owned stainless steel producer, Outokumpu, 
also increased its share of the finance. As Fortum is a potential competitor of 
Fennovoima through its ownership in the country’s third, fourth, and fifth nuclear 
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reactors, the result is somewhat awkward. This evoked debate in Finnish society 
on whether the Russian state had persuaded Finnish state authorities to perceive 
foreign policy interests in good-neighborly relations to be at stake, thus requiring 
partly state-owned companies to join the project.
To dispel some of these worries, Rosatom directed attention to joint Finnish-
Russian business interests. In light of our approach, this paves the way for the appli-
cation of soft power. In addition to the project entry of Fortum and Outokumpu, 
the plant supplier Rusatom Overseas, and the main contractor, Titan-2 concluded 
a project management agreement with SRV (2015; see also Table 1), a Finnish 
construction company operating in Russia, in return for the latter’s financial com-
mitment to Fennovoima. Rosatom welcomed the support from the Finnish gov-
ernment and new shareholders, promising to guarantee “compliance with budgets 
and contract terms” and “provide the most reliable technology” (Rosatom 2015b). 
President Putin praised the Finnish Parliament for its difficult decision to support 
the project, which, according to him, was beneficial to the Russian economy and a 
good investment by the Russian National Wealth Fund (President of Russia 2015). 
However, by autumn 2016, the Russian Ministry of Finance was reconsidering the 
infrastructure commitments of the fund to finance the gaps in the Russian budget 
(Papchenkova 2016).
As a shareholder in the prospective electricity seller Fennovoima, Rosatom could 
also point to common interests with Finnish actors regarding the plant’s inte-
gration into the Finnish (and northern European) power market. First, electricity 
consumption was set to increase (MEE 2014a; The Council of State 2014), creat-
ing demand for the plant’s electricity. Second, while Hanhikivi-1 would serve the 
Finnish interest in reducing dependence on Russian electricity imports, it would 
also have an important role in balancing markets in peak consumption situations. 
Third, nuclear new build would respond to market demand for de-carbonized 
electricity. Fourth, it would allegedly decrease electricity prices.6
The institutional dimension
To pursue its business, Rosatom will have to pass a three-step Finnish licensing 
process. In 2014 it passed the first hurdle. However, because Rosatom was not 
mentioned as the reactor supplier in the positive decision-in-principle of 2010, 
the Finnish MEAE required Fennovoima to supplement its application. The Green 
Party of the government coalition deemed the changes in reactor type and output 
to require a new application. Moreover, the government program, negotiated in 
the aftermath of Fukushima, included a moratorium for any new decisions-in-prin-
ciple for nuclear power. The Greens linked the project to Russian foreign policy 
interests by criticizing the government heavily for “Finlandization” (pre-emptive 
accommodation of Russian interests), which our approach treats as an instance of 
Russia using soft power, whereas in the Cold War era the phrase referred to efforts 
to deter the specter of Russia using hard power. The project also allegedly violated 
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the objective of reducing dependence on energy imports in the EU Energy Union 
(Hautala and Jávor 2014; Milne 2014). The Green Party decided to resign from 
the government and the Finnish Parliament approved the amended application 
(Syrjämäki, Kojo, and Litmanen 2015).
The second step in Finland is the construction license. To this end, Fennovoima 
will deliver documentation to the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
STUK for the safety assessment in several phases (Fennovoima 2015b). Before being 
caught up in delays itself, Rosatom criticized Fennovoima for slow handling and 
submission of these documents and was concerned about possible delays in licens-
ing (Paananen 2016). STUK had its own concerns regarding the safety culture of 
Fennovoima (Toivonen 2016), and the regulator ordered an evaluation of that 
safety culture. The Finnish media also rightly foresaw that the application process 
for the construction license would be delayed (Akimo 2017).
In 2014 then-Prime Minister Alexander Stubb stated that the project “…should 
not be mixed with politics” (Tass 2014). However, in 2016 the Finland’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2016) had several reservations. These were due to loss of image 
among the EU partners owing to the role of Rosatom as a state company, when the 
European Union was seeking to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. Criticism 
of Russian policies in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the effect of sanctions on the 
financing of the project, availability of spare parts, components, and nuclear fuel, 
likewise the ability of Fennovoima to sustain the 60% EU area ownership during 
the lifetime of the plant were a part of the concern. The third phase of licensing 
will be the operating license.
The role of Rosatom as a state company influenced acceptance by society. 
According to an opinion poll, 46% of Finns wanted to postpone the project, 17% 
wanted to abandon it altogether, 30% to continue it, and the remainder were 
undecided (Vehkaoja 2014; see also Arola 2014). To ensure local acceptance in 
the host municipality of Pyhäjoki, Fennovoima organized events for stakehold-
ers, sponsored activities for young people and sports, and also promised jobs 
and opportunities for local companies (Jussila and Sipola 2014; Rosatom 2015b; 
Titan-2 2015; Kaleva 2016).
The ecological dimension
Rosatom encountered a relatively favorable policy environment in the Finnish 
case as regards the ecological dimension. The project was compatible with Finnish 
and EU climate policy and de-carbonization targets. The government of Finland 
deemed the overall environmental impact reasonable when weighed against the 
benefits. However, the Ministry of the Environment disagreed, claiming that the 
project might well delay domestic investments in renewables, citing the risks of 
reactor accidents and deficiencies in nuclear waste management (The Council of 
State 2014).
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With Rosatom as the reactor supplier, Fennovoima had to update the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report (Syrjämäki, Kojo, and Litmanen 
2015). The updated report concluded that in relation to the originally intended 
1800 MW plant, “the impact of radioactive emissions will be of roughly the same 
magnitude” (Fennovoima 2014).
To support the Russian interest in modernization and diversification of exports, 
Rosatom needed Hanhikivi-1 as an international reference. It therefore needed to 
fulfill the nuclear safety standards in Finland. In 2012 Rosatom recruited the retired 
Director General of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen, as Vice President in Rosatom Overseas. 
According to Rosatom (see Atomenergoprom 2012), the recruitment “speaks of 
how much importance we attach to the effectiveness and safety of our projects.” In 
the preliminary safety assessment, STUK (2014a, 2014b) required revisions to meet 
the Finnish requirements. Further criticism from neighboring Sweden focused on 
the cross-border impacts of the plant.
By 2016, Fennovoima had not solved the problem of management of spent 
nuclear fuel. Posiva Ltd., which is building a final disposal facility for the existing 
NPPs, only agreed to collaborate by selling expert services, but not to share the 
facility. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (2014, 2016) deemed 
Fennovoima’s reports sufficient at that point and allowed it to continue the process 
of applying for a construction license. The government intends to decide on the 
application by 2019 (Table 2).
The realization of Russian interests in the case of Hungary
In 2015, 52% of the electricity produced in Hungary came from nuclear power, 
19% from coal, 17% from natural gas, and the rest from renewables (mostly from 
biomass and wind power); however, altogether 38% of electricity consumed was 
imported (European Commission 2017b). In Hungary the share of nuclear power 
in the generation of electricity is the fifth largest in Europe after France, Slovakia, 
Belgium, and Ukraine (Index 2014). Hungary’s overall energy import dependence, 
52% in 2013, was in line with the EU average, or high by Hungarian standards 
(European Commission 2015b; Ministry of National Development 2012). In 2012, 
85% of oil, 79% of natural gas, and 100% of nuclear fuel were Russian imports 
(Ámon and Deák 2015). Since Hungary is land-locked, alternative suppliers of oil 
and natural gas are limited.
Soviet nuclear technology and Russian nuclear fuel supplies are indispensable 
to Hungary’s nuclear energy sector. Politically, Hungary belonged to COMECON 
and the Warsaw Pact, thus ordering a nuclear power plant from the West was prac-
tically impossible (Nyyssönen 2006). The town of Paks in southern Hungary is the 
site of four Soviet-supplied 500 MW VVER-440 reactors, operated by the fully state-
owned MVM (Magyar Villamos Művek). In March 2009 the Hungarian Parliament 
made a decision-in-principle on the preparatory work for Paks-2, comprising two 
new units. In June 2012 the government made Paks-2 a high priority. The oldest 
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two Paks reactors received a 20-year lifetime extension in 2012 and 2014 until 
the 2030s. The expansion of nuclear power takes place in the context of several 
cut-offs of natural gas deliveries to Hungary since the mid-2000s due to Russian-
Ukrainian disputes (Ackermann 2014; Marnitz 2014). To decrease the risks of tran-
sit through Ukraine, Hungary supported the Gazprom-led South Stream pipeline 
project, which had collapsed by late 2014. The Hungarian debate then turned to 
possible Russian gas imports through Turkey (Népszabadság 2015a). Russian actors 
have consolidated their position in the Hungarian energy sector since the return 
to power of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party in 2010.
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The resources, technology and infrastructure dimension
Rosatom concluded the agreement for the Paks-2 NPP in Moscow in January 2014, 
in the presence of Rosatom CEO Sergei Kiriyenko, President Putin, and PM Orbán. 
The Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company Atomenergoproekt (NIAEP-ASE) (see 
Table 1) is responsible for the engineering, procurement, and construction of two 
1200 MW VVER AES1200 reactors, modeled on Hungary’s existing reactors. They 
should be in commercial operation by 2025 and 2026, although the Environmental 
Impact Assessment mentions the years 2025 and 2030 (see MVM Erbe 2015).
Rosatom’s subsidiary, JSC TVEL, originally concluded a 20-year exclusive nuclear 
fuel supply agreement with MVM, which was cut to 10 years after the Euratom 
Supply Agency and the European Commission intervened to ensure competition 
among fuel suppliers.
The position of Russian companies as the major subcontractors serves not only 
the business and profits interests of Rosatom, its network, and the Russian govern-
ment, but also Russian modernization and the diversification of exports interest. 
In February 2015 the German Chancellor Angela Merkel promoted the interests of 
Siemens in the construction process (Magyar Nemzet 2015; Népszabadság 2014b, 
2015b).
The financial, business models and markets dimension
The estimated cost of Paks-2 is €12 billion, including the supply of nuclear 
fuel. Rosatom initially committed to arranging a €10 billion loan, repayable by 
2044, with the fully state-owned Vnesheconombank as the likeliest funder. The 
Hungarian side was to provide €2 billion, but in early 2017 President Putin raised 
his offer to cover the whole amount of the loan.7 According to Attila Aszodi, the 
state commissioner in charge of the expansion, the offer of finance made Rosatom 
preferable to Areva or Westinghouse (Than 2015). However, concerns emerged in 
Hungary of how a long-term loan from a Russian state entity to a Hungarian state 
entity might inadvertently serve Russian foreign policy interests at the expense 
of Hungary. The European Commission for its part scrutinized the Hungarian part 
of the financing regarding possible state subsidies but approved it after measures 
to control “undue distortions” of competition in the Hungarian energy market 
(European Commission 2017c; Népszabadság 2015e, 2016).
In the Hungarian case, Rosatom used a turnkey business model similar to that 
used in Finland and sought to accommodate Hungarian interests by transferring 
the plant to full ownership of MVM and by assuring domestic firms a 40% share in 
the construction processes. The Hungarian government furthermore expected the 
plant to generate up to 10,000 new jobs and reduce energy dependence (Lázár 
2014).
However, contrary to its plans in Finland, Rosatom will not sell electricity in 
the Hungarian market. Becoming a market participant in Hungary may in fact 
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compromise the profit interests of Rosatom. In 2013 PM Orbán suggested that 
Hungarian electricity prices could become the lowest in the CEE in some four or five 
years (Index 2013). However, some observers deem such expectations odd given 
the investment costs of the new units, which should make consumer prices some 
three times higher to render the investments profitable (Sipos 2013). The govern-
ment has based its legitimacy on low electricity prices and committed to rezsicsök-
kentés, meaning the reduction of utility bills and living costs. This was one of the key 
issues in the 2014 election campaign of the Orbán regime (Népszabadság 2014a; 
Kovács 2015). In practice, the government’s policy of determining the price has 
led to rezsiharc (overhead war) with Brussels (Magyar Nemzet 2014). The opposi-
tion has supported more market-based mechanisms with the argument that low 
prices lead to higher consumption and delay investments in renewable energy.
Since 2014 a debate over electricity prices has gone on concurrently with 
emerging concerns about Russian foreign policy interests. Such intermingling of 
the dimension of finance, business models, and markets with foreign policy issues 
has become part of the policy environment Russian actors encounter in Hungary. 
Thus when President Putin visited Hungary in February 2015, he witnessed expres-
sions of these concerns with demonstrators shouting slogans like “We will not be 
a [Russian] colony” (Népszabadság 2015a,c).
The institutional dimension
Rosatom was negotiating the Paks-2 agreement at a time when Hungary’s relations 
with the European Union and the United States were cooling. Rosatom signed the 
2014 agreement with Hungary after the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, had 
accepted a deal with Russia instead of the long-negotiated association agreement 
with the EU. However, Rosatom concluded the agreement before the Ukrainian 
Maidan uprising led to his ousting from office and the European Union, the United 
States, and several other states imposed sanctions on Russia.
Unlike in Finland, Rosatom was not dealing with a nuclear power lobby consist-
ing of industries and municipalities but with a government interested in retaining 
its domestic political power, making the Paks-2 agreement part of its electoral 
campaign. While in opposition, the Fidesz Party was critical of Russian influence. 
When in office and in the run-up to the elections, it allied its interests to stay in 
power with the interests of Rosatom and Russia (Lázár 2014). Our approach treats 
the emergence of such shared interests as a platform for Russian actors using soft 
power. Orbán’s overwhelming majority enabling a powerful leadership similar to 
that enjoyed by President Putin for its part paved the way for Russian actors to 
focus any persuasive efforts required on only one group in Hungary. The super-
majority enabled Fidesz to limit the parliamentary processing to just four days. The 
ruling party received support from the ultra-nationalist Jobbik Party, which has 
connections to Russia, but also faced espionage allegations (Népszabadság 2015f).
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The agreement and its parliamentary approval resulted in institutional turmoil 
beyond the control of Rosatom or Russia. The first reactions of the opposition and 
the NGOs ranged from calls for a referendum to an extra session of the parliament 
(Népszabadság 2014b). In 2014 the green-liberal Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) pro-
tested against the parliamentary session by sounding a siren: they criticized the 
hasty parliamentary procedure and lack of access to background documents (ATV 
2014), as did the former President of Hungary, László Sólyom. While Paks-2 was 
one of the most important decisions of the Orbán government, the opposition 
deemed the quality of political debate low, their own treatment unfair, and the 
whole procedure a violation of the order of the parliament (Tibor 2014). Fidesz 
framed the agreement with Rosatom in terms of national security and thereby 
justified the classification of the documents.
Eventually the President of Hungary, János Áder, ratified the bill in February 
2014. By November 2014, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had com-
mended Hungary for not succumbing to “Russophobic approaches,” unlike some 
other CEE states in the EU (Than 2015). In 2015 the European Commission launched 
an infringement procedure against Hungary for suspected violation of the pub-
lic procurement rules, but closed the case in November 2016. In the European 
Parliament, in addition to criticism of the state of democracy and freedom in 
Hungary, the Paks case raised doubts regarding the lack of public consultation, 
ambiguous energy security effects, and compatibility with European law (cf. 
Parliamentary questions 2015).
The Hungarian government effectively restructured some of the norms and 
practices in the country at the expense of transparency by classifying the details 
of the case for 30 years instead of the normal 15 years. The government justified 
this by fears about sensitive information being leaked to terrorists (Népszabadság 
2015d). The LMP again adopted extra-parliamentary measures such as using meg-
aphones and banners (Országgüylési Napló 2015). The Russian and Hungarian 
governments completed the formalities by updating the 2001 intergovernmental 
agreement on nuclear energy (Soglashenie 2014).
Soon after the classification decision, in March 2015, the Hungarian Greens 
organized a hearing in Parliament (Daily News Hungary 2015). They compared the 
expedited procedure to that in Finland wherein Fennovoima negotiated on details 
for years, and questioned if the government was unaware of the EU Commission’s 
opposition to the initially agreed 20 years’ fuel supply monopoly. The leader of the 
Hungarian civic lobby Energiaklub, Ada Ámon, further criticized the government’s 
failure to publish any studies on the impacts of the Paks-2 project on the energy 
markets or prices (Hungary Matters 2015; Index 2015). Overall, for the government, 
the case depended on domestic interests in retaining political power by securing 
allegedly cheap energy. For the opposition, it compromised Hungarian foreign 
policy interests in committing the future of the country for decades to come. The 
opposition perceived the government to have been influenced by Russian use of 
soft power.
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The ecological dimension
Vis-à-vis the ecological dimension, Rosatom negotiated with a government pre-
ferring centralized nuclear power production due to interests in security of supply, 
controlling costs, and meeting the decarbonization objectives agreed on at the EU 
level (Ministry of National Development 2012, 28–29). By contrast, some opposi-
tion groups preferred a more decentralized energy system based on renewable 
sources of energy. For example, the Energiaklub referred to Denmark, which by 
2050 aims to achieve an energy system based totally on renewables (MTI 2015). 
The EU Commission also warned the Hungarian government of how the policy of 
maintaining low regulated prices might compromise the prospects of improving 
energy efficiency (Canton et al. 2013).
Rosatom and MVM had to modify some technical and safety features of the 
Paks-2 NPP after the publication of the EIA report in 2015 (see MVM Paks II 2016), 
which also evoked international criticism regarding the quality of the documen-
tation (Nuclear Transparency Watch 2015). The environmental license granted 
in September 2016 was upheld against complaints in April 2017. The Hungarian 
Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) granted the site and construction license in March 
2017, which would enable building to start on time in 2018 (MVM Paks II 2016).
The HAEA is also responsible for safety and waste issues. Under the 1995 pol-
icy, spent fuel is stored in pools at Paks for five years and is then transferred to an 
interim (50-year) dry storage facility. For the long-lived intermediate-level and 
high-level wastes, a claystone formation in the southwest has been investigated. 
The construction of a long-term depository has been ongoing since 2012 (WNA 
2017) (Table 3).
Conclusion
Russia has an abundance of energy resources attracting interest from a wide range 
of foreign governments and companies, enabling Russia to exercise active energy 
diplomacy. We used the structuration approach to scrutinize in more detail how 
Russian actors seek to take advantage of their considerable assets in the nuclear 
energy sector. However, our analysis stressed that Russian nuclear energy diplo-
macy has to serve several interests simultaneously while accessing foreign markets 
in the target countries. In the cases of Finland and Hungary, it faces the structural 
constraints ensuing from EU-level policy and the national policy environments. Our 
approach and research questions focused specifically on this difficult “fit” between 
the interests of the Russian actors with the features of the relevant policy envi-
ronment. Regarding our first research question, each of the three interests we 
postulated is discernible in the two cases.
Rosatom pursued its joint interest with other Russian actors in the energy busi-
ness and profits by offering a broadly similar technological solution for the Finnish 
and Hungarian contracting parties; that is, the same reactor type and agreements 
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for the supply of nuclear fuel and related infrastructure. To pursue this business 
interest, Rosatom was attentive to the case-specific constraints of the policy envi-
ronment in these two cases. Stulberg (2007) found the same also to be true of 
Rosatom’s conduct in Central Asia. In Finland and Hungary, Rosatom and its net-
work supplied the technology and infrastructure on a turnkey basis. However, in 
Finland, Rosatom also sought further profits by becoming a co-owner and market 
participant in the Finnish electricity market connected further to Northern Europe. 
In the Hungarian case, where the Orbán government is keen to maintain low 
electricity prices and where profits are harder to make, Rosatom limits itself to a 
(potential) financier and plant supplier role. In both cases, a key asset of Rosatom 
was its offer of state-backed finance – in the Finnish case, it was decisive for the 
project to continue.
Russian interest in the modernization of its economy and diversification of its 
export structure was also equally discernible. Rosatom cultivated Soviet-era tech-
nological expertise by offering a new version of a tried and tested reactor design 
that was already to some extent familiar to the Finnish and Hungarian actors. This, 
too, constituted an asset for Rosatom when competing designs suffered from 
technological problems at sites ranging from Japan’s Fukushima to Finland’s badly 
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delayed fifth NPP unit built by Areva. Following a developmentalist economic 
model (Lowry 2016), the state-owned Rosatom backed by state funding and its 
network offered high technology products and services, generated sub-contract-
ing for Russian companies, and hence helped to modernize parts of the Russian 
economy and diversify the export portfolio away from oil and gas.
The Russian state also furthered its foreign policy interests in both cases by 
reinforcing an established diplomatic relationship in the nuclear energy sector and 
extending its life for decades. These foreign policy gains are valuable in contrast 
to the constraints in wider EU-Russia energy diplomacy, in particular sanctions 
in the oil sector and controversies over gas supplies. Although Russian foreign 
policymakers commented favorably on the Finnish and Hungarian NPP projects, 
they were careful not to directly connect these to foreign policy influence. Yet such 
potential influence was discerned in the commentary by the Finnish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and groups opposing the projects in Finland and Hungary. While 
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy vis-à-vis Finland was conducted mostly through 
Rosatom and its subsidiaries to avoid politicization, in the Hungarian case it had a 
more open state-to-state character involving these countries’ respective presidents 
in a high-level dialog.
The pursuit of Russian foreign policy interests also involves the use of soft power. 
In Finland, partly state-owned companies and firms with interests in Russia were 
persuaded to enter the Hanhikivi-1 project to reach the 60% Finnish or EU-area 
ownership criteria set by the government. After initial hesitations, the Finnish par-
ties concluded joint interests with Russian actors to be at stake. In both countries, 
Rosatom’s network was able to enhance such a perception by creating subcontract-
ing roles and jobs for local firms. The foreign policy interests, however, remained 
more subtle than in the case of Rosatom’s Akkuyu NPP project in Turkey. This pro-
ject only regained its momentum once Russia and Turkey resumed diplomatic 
relations after the impasse over the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey in 
2015, following Turkey’s failed military coup and subsequent domestic develop-
ments in the summer of 2016 that pushed Turkey further toward an outsider role 
in relation to the EU similar to that of Russia.
Our second research question concerned the extent to which Russian actors 
could realize their interests in the two cases. We found Russian actors adept at 
using their considerable assets on the dimension of resources, technology, and 
infrastructure. However, their record of balancing the assets and structural con-
straints on the dimension of finance, business models, and markets is more mixed. 
In both cases Rosatom made an attractive financing offer accompanied by a turn-
key business model. Yet, in the Finnish case it was poorly informed on the political 
necessity of the 60% requirement for domestic or EU area ownership. It defended 
the entry as a project partner of a small Croatian company that the Finnish author-
ities ultimately deemed a front organization potentially utilizing Russian funding 
from a state-owned institution in place of EU-area financing.
408   P. AALTO ET AL.
In terms of the institutional dimension, in Finland Rosatom passed the first 
step required by Finnish law regardless of objections by the parliamentary oppo-
sition. In Hungary, Rosatom was strangely unaware of how the EU-level market 
regulation hampers the use of long-term supply contracts and had to wait for the 
Commission to rule on whether the planned financial package was compatible 
with EU law on state aid. Overall, Rosatom and its partners encountered fewer 
constraints in Hungary on the part of the domestic opposition than in Finland due 
to the Hungarian government effectively suppressing dissent. This, for its part, 
made Hungary a target of criticism in the European Parliament.
On the ecological dimension, Rosatom embarked on a learning process to 
improve its expertise by participating in the discussion Fennovoima had with the 
Finnish nuclear safety authorities. In Hungary Rosatom encountered similar criti-
cism on safety and cross-border impacts as it did in Finland. Yet it benefited from 
the campaign launched by the government in 2015 stressing the de-carbonizing 
advantages of the Paks-2 project.
In summary, we find the heaviest constraints emerging for Russian actors on 
the institutional dimension. This shows how the energy sector has featured more 
regulation, policy measures, and scrutiny since the predecessor of Rosatom con-
cluded the first agreements in Cold War Europe. At the same time, the nuclear 
energy diplomacy of Russian actors has managed to remove some institutional 
constraints by skillfully preparing the ground for the emergence of joint ventures 
and other interests. This has enabled Russian actors to use soft power to shape 
perceptions in the target country. Although this involvement of Russian foreign 
policy interests is milder and subtler than some western observers have warned, it 
is something Russia seeks when sanctions and lower prices for oil and gas make any 
gains harder to come by elsewhere than in the field of nuclear energy diplomacy.
Notes
1.  Rosatom has examined the prospects of expanding its operations in Slovakia, while 
Bulgaria is looking to revive the Belene NPP project where Rosatom was the supplier 
before the agreement was canceled in 2012.
2.  The nuclear energy sector is not directly subject to the sanctions as is offshore and 
Arctic oil; no Rosatom subsidiaries are under sanctions as of August 2017. However, 
the sanctions influence the nuclear energy trade and diplomacy indirectly. Access to 
long-term international finance and high-level political meeting is restricted, including 
travel and visa bans on some high-ranking political and business leaders (Aalto and 
Forsberg 2016).
3.  For example, in May 2017, the US Air Force used Finnish airbases for NATO military 
exercises while in June 2016, NATO troops conducted a landing drill along the Finnish 
coastline.
4.  As with other strategic industries in Russia, some observers expect that some of the 
actors in the networks involved seek personal business benefits since the ownership 
structures lack transparency (see e.g. Tikkala 2016). Although such informal networks 
may not be optimal for competition, they can be functional for unifying state and 
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business actors, helping them to distribute resources and ultimately, conduct business 
(Ledeneva 2013, 249–250).
5.  The official English translation was changed in 2015 from the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (MEE) to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE).
6.  However, the maximum price of €50/MWh promised to the owners of Fennovoima 
(Fennovoima 2013b) is much higher than the actual average prices on the Nord Pool 
market in the 2010s.
7.  Comparing the Hungarian case to the ongoing British Hinkley Point project, Stephen 
Thomas of the University of Greenwich estimated that Paks would be built essentially 
cheaper than its British counterpart: €5200 per KWh against Hinkley’s €7000 (Index 
2015). The Russian loan would be beneficial for the Hungarians: 3.95–4.95% compared 
to the British project at 9.75–10.25%. However, János Tóth István pointed out that there 
is often room for corruption as costs of nuclear power plants seldom remain within 
their budgets (2015).
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